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Abstract 
The information contents of memory are the cornerstone of the most influential models in 
cognition.  To illustrate, consider that in predictive coding, a prediction implies that specific 
information is propagated down from memory through the visual hierarchy. Likewise, 
recognizing the input implies that sequentially accrued sensory evidence is successfully matched 
with memorized information (categorical knowledge). Although existing models of prediction, 
memory, sensory representation and categorical decision are all implicitly cast within an 
information processing framework, it remains a challenge to precisely specify what this 
information is, and therefore where, when and how the architecture of the brain dynamically 
processes it to produce behavior.  Here, we review a framework that addresses these 
challenges for studies of perception and categorization - Stimulus Information Representation 
(SIR).  We illustrate how SIR can reverse engineer the information contents of memory from 
behavioral and brain measures in the context of specific cognitive tasks that involve memory.  
We discuss two specific lessons from this approach that generally apply to memory studies: The 
importance of task, to constrain what the brain does, and of stimulus variations, to identify the 
specific information contents that are memorized, predicted, recalled and replayed. 
The machinery that performs visual cognition has an extraordinary range of capabilities that is 
supported by the most powerful of sensory systems.  Starting with the high-dimensional retinal 
input that comprises 150M rods and cones, a large proportion of the cortex (30% to 60%) is 
then dedicated to accomplishing the feats of visual cognition. Amongst these is the ability to 
flexibly reduce the high dimensional, highly variable input to flexibly categorize it to produce 
adaptive behaviors1–3.  To illustrate, consider the street scene shown on the left-hand side of 
Figure 1.  The brain can perform numerous categorization tasks on this image: it can identify the 
country, city, and street; the houses and shops; the moving and stationary cars, their makes and 
models, age and condition; the people shopping or those just passing by, as well as their gait, 
identity, emotion and social interactions; it can also infer the weather, time of day, season and 
so on. These are only very few of the vary many categorizations that our brains perform 
apparently continuously and effortlessly. 
 
To accomplish this feat, current models in the cognitive sciences assume that the categorization 
processes performed by the brain use memory representations, both to predict the incoming 
stimulus (e.g. a street, the type of a car or the emotion of a face) and also to categorize it (e.g. 
as “Byres Road,” “new Beetle,” “face” or “happy”, see Figure 1).  In these processes, the 
information contents stored in memory play a critical role in transforming the stimulus 
information that projects on the high-dimensional retina into categorization behavior.  
However, it is notoriously difficult to understand what these memorized contents are, 
specifically.  And without these contents, it is impossible to develop and test information 
processing models of brain activity, the stumbling block of the neuroimaging agenda. 
 
To bridge the interpretation gap, we developed the Stimulus Information Representation (SIR) 
framework4.   Specifically, we show SIR can characterize the stimulus information contents 
stored in memory that are used to flexibly categorize incoming stimuli, and in turn to reveal 
where, when and how these contents are represented and processed in the brain.  SIR 
comprises three critical elements that enable this interpretative step change: (1) rich stimulus 
variations with precise control, (2) an explicit control of behavior via specific cognitive tasks and 
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(3) a new analytical methodology that better decomposes brain activity (e.g. into that which 
represents task-relevant, vs. task-irrelevant features). Though our applications of SIR are drawn 
from vision, the approach, which is based on the framework of psychophysics, is 
straightforwardly generalizable to any sensory modality.   
 
Analyses of visual categorization processes with SIR provide a useful test bed to discuss the 
reactivation of neural activity that represents specific information during memory recall.  For 
example, car experts would memorize the characteristic shape of the “new Beetle” in Figure 1.  
More casual observers could instead memorize general information about the car, leading to 
the same car being represented with different features in memory.  Consequently, experts and 
novices could generally recall or replay different features about the same pictures.  The key 
points here are first that observers can only predict or reactivate the information contents that 
they have memorized about a stimulus category5–8 and second that we can generally expect 
these contents to vary to some degree across observers due to relative category expertise.  
Hence, if we aim to understand the mechanisms that use memorized information contents (e.g. 
for categorization, as we will illustrate, but also for prediction and reactivation, as we will 
discuss), a useful starting point is to characterize what these contents are, to be able to trace 
their specific reactivation into brain activity, and thereby bridge the interpretation gap. 
     
The SIR Framework 
The SIR framework starts with a critical constraint – a cognitive task – to constrain what the 
brain is doing when we come to analyze its activity.  As illustrated earlier in Figure 1, a single 
stimulus can in principle recruit as many brain representations and processes as there are 
possible categorizations.  However, typical brain imaging studies of visual categorization are 
designed as if the stimulus (or a category of stimuli, e.g. face, car, or city) on its own is sufficient 
to generate and therefore control specific representations and processes of the brain 9–11.  
However, as illustrated, to achieve this necessary level of control, we must constrain the explicit 
cognitive task that the brain performs on the stimulus12–15.  Next, having circumscribed a task, 
we then need to characterize the specific stimulus information that supports this categorization 
in memory13,16. Otherwise, we will not know what information the brain has used to make 
different categorizations such as “Byres road,” or “New Beetle,” “Face” or “Happy,” from the 
same stimulus (see Figure 1).  
 
Such task-relevant information processing is a generic, but often neglected, theoretical point 
that applies both to the interpretation of any sensory categorization in the brain and to its 
models.  In the case of studies of memory, the tasks performed on a stimulus, or a stimulus 
category, even implicitly, impact the stimulus features that are memorized, particularly so when 
the input is high-dimensional5,7,17 (as in Figure 1).  In such situations, only partial, task-
dependent stimulus representations are learned, and so when this stimulus is recalled, the 
current categorization task is likely to influence the stimulus features that will be recalled5. 
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Figure 1.  The human brain typically performs multiple categorization tasks on a single image using task-relevant 
stimulus information. For example, the brain uses coarse, global scene information to categorize this image as 
“street” in a categorization task.  By contrast, local details (i.e. other task-relevant information), as represented by 
finer image resolution, support other categorization tasks, such as “cars and their make/model” and “people”. As 
we will illustrate, in the SIR framework, samples of the stimulus are randomly generated and shown to participants 
to categorize (blue set). This approach generates variations in the participant’s categorization behavior (green set, 
e.g., “people”). Concurrently, participants’ brain activity is recorded using neuroimaging techniques (such as EEG 
and MEG, see the red set) while they perform the task. The three-way interaction between these three SIR 
components (<stimulus variation; brain; behavior>), as represented by the color-coded set intersection, enables us 
to better understand where, when and how task-relevant information is processed in the brain. 
 
The SIR framework has been used to address such task-relevant information processing 
questions because it can isolate the specific stimulus information that drives variations in the 
brain activity that in turn generate variations in behavioral responses in a circumscribed task.  
For example, a typical design in the sciences of cognition involves multiple repeated trials of a 
specific task. SIR considers the three-way interactions between concurrent trial-by-trial 
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variations of the three main components of such an experiment:  stimulus variation, brain 
activity and behavioral responses. We will now detail each component and the procedure using 
concrete examples from vision science.  
 
Stimulus variation 
As we will illustrate with concrete examples, stimulus variation is crucial to explore, in a data-
driven manner, a richer palette of brain and behavioral responses, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
Stimulus variation can take different forms: it can consist of images generated by the random 
selection of pixels16,18–20, or by sampling from generative models of complex stimuli21–25. Such 
stimuli (as described in more detail below with images) are then presented to participants, who 
are asked to categorize them. So, in this first step, we randomly sample the variables that 
control stimulus information on each trial (as represented by the blue set in Figure 1).  
 
Behavioral measures 
The second component of SIR consists of measuring behavioral variables in the performance of 
a categorization task such as response accuracy, reaction time or confidence ratings, on 
individual experimental trials (as represented by the green set in Figure 1). Critically, when 
participants perform a categorization task on randomly generated stimuli, their behavioral 
responses can be used to disentangle what stimulus variables are relevant to that categorization 
task from those that are not. In this way, the participants’ behavioral responses can reveal in a 
data-driven manner what information the participant (and therefore their brain) selectively uses 
to categorize information as “Byres road”, or “New Beetle,” “Face” or “Happy” (see Figure 1).  
Simply stated, we know the what of the information processing task. 
 
Brain measures 
Next, to understand where, when, and how the brain processes the what (i.e. the task-relevant 
variables), we also measure its activity while participants perform the categorization task using 
various brain-imaging techniques, such as electroencephalography (EEG), 
magnetoencephalogram (MEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), near infrared 
spectroscopy (NIRS), electrocorticography (ECoG) or single-cell recordings. The red-shaded set 
in Figure 1 represents variables in brain activity recorded during a task, as recorded by different 
sensors, at different sources or time points, or 3D voxels of bold activity, or representing 
different neuron firing rates.  
 
Together, the three components of SIR test how randomly sampled stimulus information 
influences brain activity and behavior during a particular categorization task. In addition, the 
three-way interactions amongst these three components, as denoted by <stimulus information; 
brain; behavior>, are represented as the four-color-coded set of intersections shown in Figure 1 
(that is, the blue, green, and red sets of the Venn-like diagram, and the white, light blue, 
magenta, and yellow areas where they intersect). With these three-way interactions, we can 
then model the information contents of the brain with unmatched interpretative precision, as 
we illustrate in the following sections. 
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Applying SIR to model and understand task-relevant information 
Here, we illustrate how SIR brings these components together to model, using reverse 
engineering, the processing of stimulus information in the brain while it is performing a 
categorization task.  We first show the two-way interactions before extending to the three-way 
interactions. In the first three examples, we reverse engineer the information contents of the 
face memory of individual participants (i.e., the what) from the two-way interactions between 
stimulus variation and three different face categorization tasks (i.e. face detection, face identity, 
and facial expressions of emotion across cultures).  In the final example, we use the three-way 
interactions (as represented by the white triple set intersection) to reverse engineer where, 
when and how the brain dynamically processes task-relevant (and task-irrelevant) information in 
a perceptual decision task.  We now review these components of the SIR framework in turn. 
 
Face detection 
Suppose we instruct each participant that they will see white noise images (see Figure 2A) and 
that half of them comprise a face well hidden in the noise (or, in another experiment, the letter 
‘S’ hidden in noise). The trick here is that there is never a face (nor a letter) in the noise stimuli; 
participants are only presented with white noise. To resolve the task, each participant will use 
memorized information to predict what a face (or letter) should look like and then match this 
prediction with the incoming input—i.e. pixel noise presented on each trial. 
 
A small positive correlation between the prediction from memory and the noise drives the 
observer to respond “face” (or “S”), even when the input is only white noise.  We can reverse 
engineer the memory prediction that guides such decisions by correlating each individual pixel 
(which is either black or white on each trial) with the corresponding detection response of the 
participant (i.e. “face” vs. “noise” on each trial, or “S” vs. “noise” in the other experiment).  The 
resulting classification image (see Figure 2A) models the information contents of the memory 
prediction for a face (or ‘S’ letter) in each participant13,18,26,27.  In SIR, the classification image is 
the light blue intersection that comprises the randomly sampled pixel variables (in the blue set) 
that are relevant for task behavior (in the green set).   
 
A foundational justification for sampling white noise to reverse engineer the information 
contents of memory is based on the Volterra and Wiener system identification in engineering.  It 
states that we can identify a complex system from a linear sum of subsystems Fi by estimating 
the kernels fi of each subsystem Fi, where the kernels are the orders of representation of 
information in memory 27–32.  For example, the light blue intersection in Figure 2A is the first 
order (i.e. pixel-by-pixel, univariate) kernel f1 captured by computing the relationship <white 
noise pixel; detection behavior>.  Higher order kernels can be added to this first order memory 
estimate, by computing <white noise pixeln; detection behavior>, for each order n of nonlinear 
relation between the sampled pixels—i.e. the f2 kernel of pairwise pixel relations, the f3 kernel 
of triplewise relations, and generally the fn kernel of n-wise pixel relations.  This approach has 
fruitfully modelled the way neurons process specific, low-dimensional sensory attributes in 
visual 33, auditory 34,35, memory 36 and somatosensory systems 37, see 32 for a review. 
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Figure 2.  Reverse engineering the contents of face memory (adapted from 13,38).  A.  Memory contents from 
univariate pixel sampling13,26.  Individual participants only saw pixel noise on each trial but were instructed that a 
face was hidden in the noise on half of the trials.  They were tasked to detect the face by responding “face” vs. “no 
face” on each trial.  Following the experiment, we computed the classification image (i.e. the relationship <Pixel 
Noise; Face Detection>) to reverse engineer the information contents of the memory prediction for a face. B. 
Memory contents from multivariate identity noise sampling38.  Individual participants saw six random identities 
controlled on each trial by a generative model of face information.  This generative model involves local averages 
based on gender, age and ethnicity, to which unique random residuals are added to generate random identities.  In 
this experiment, randomly sampled identities were added to the same gender, age and ethnicity as the target face 
(e.g. ‘Mary’ a Western Caucasian female of 36 years of age).  On each trial, participants were tasked to choose the 
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random face that looks most like ‘Mary’ and to rate this similarity on a 1 to 6 Likert scale.  Following the 
experiment, we computed the relationship <Identity Noise; Similarity to ‘Mary’> to reverse engineer the 
information contents of familiar face memory.  We then compared the memory representations of ‘Mary’ (left 
panel) and ‘Peter’ (right panel) with the objective ground truth information that defines these familiar identities in 
the face model.  Colored vertices indicate the vertices that faithfully represent ‘Mary’ in memory.  Vertex colors in 
the scatter plots are reported as color-coded vertices in the memory representations. 
 
A key advantage of such white noise sampling is the few assumptions that it makes about the 
structure of information in memory, letting instead a data-driven computation based on 
behavioral responses to discover this structure as the fi kernels of the Volterra-Wiener 
expansion. However, this approach is impractical with images of realistic faces, objects and 
scenes, where each individual pixel becomes a first order parameter to estimate, together with  
the many orders of interactions between individual pixels that make up natural image features.  
Furthermore, natural image features form densely correlated clusters of pixels, whose 
occurrence will be extremely rare if each image pixel is independently and randomly sampled.  
Thus, the finite time of a human experiment will make it practically near impossible to estimate 
the memorized representations of natural image features using white noise pixel stimuli. To 
address these shortcomings, a fruitful approach is to hypothesize that memorized information is 
structured, and then embed the structuring hypotheses as the explicit dimensions of a 
generative model of the stimulus.  The next examples apply this generative approach in two 
different tasks. 
 
Face identity 
Here, the task is to identify a familiar face from memory38.  What stimulus information should 
we randomly generate to reverse engineer the memorized information that guides this task?  As 
discussed, a starting point is to hypothesize, and then model, the information structure of real-
world human faces. We note that human faces are statistically smooth, textured surfaces that 
systematically vary according to their age, sex, ethnicity and, of course, identity.  A good model 
would therefore isolate the information that uniquely identifies a face from that which is shared 
across faces to represent their age, sex, and ethnicity.  We formalized these constraints within a 
linear model that separates the identity component of a face (e.g. ‘Mary’) from the component 
that represents their shared age, sex and ethnicity as a local average (e.g. the average of all 36 
years old Western white females). 
 
Equipped with this explicit model, we come back to the original question of the identity noise 
that we should generate to reverse engineer the contents of familiar face memory.  Suppose 
that the target face is ‘Mary,’ a 36-year-old Western white female well known to her colleagues.  
To generate identity noise, we use the two-component model just discussed, and within it set 
the local average to represent all 36-year-old, Western white females.  We add to this shared 
average a randomly generated component of identity as illustrated with the six random 
identities in Figure 2B.  Critically, these faces share the same local average age, sex and ethnicity 
as ‘Mary’ and only differ in identity.  On each trial, we then ask the participant to select the face 
(amongst the six presented) most similar to ‘Mary’ and to rate this similarity on a 1-6 scale from 
“not at all similar” to “very similar.”  Following the experiment, we compute for each participant 
the light blue intersection <identity noise; similarity to ‘Mary’>, for each multivariate 
component that controls the shape identity noise (and texture identity noise, not shown).  The 
result models the memory contents of a familiar face. 
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For each participant, we can then compare these memory contents with the ground truth—i.e. 
the objective identity information of the familiar face.  To illustrate, grey faces on the x-axis of 
Figure 2B show the ground truth identity that defines ‘Mary’ (and ‘Peter’) as Inward and 
Outward 3D shape deviations in relation to the shared local average. For example, Mary’s nose 
is objectively thinner than average and so these vertices deviate inward (darker grey tones 
indicate increasing deviations). Likewise, her more pouty mouth is shown as an outward 3D 
shape deviation. The y-axis of Figure 2A uses the same format to show the memory contents for 
‘Mary’ in one typical participant, where colors indicate increasing deviations. These contents 
reveal faithful representations of, for example, a thinner nose and a pouty mouth. The scatter 
plot visualizes the vertex by vertex fit between the memory representation (y-axis) and the 
ground truth 3D face (x-axis). The white diagonal line provides a veridical reference, where the 
identity component in the memory representation is identical to the ground truth face, for 
every single 3D vertex.  
 
There is an important difference between the white noise used in the face detection example 
and the component identity noise used here.  Whereas the white noise was pixel-by-pixel (i.e. 
32 x 43 = 1,376 univariate parameters), making few assumptions about the structure of memory 
representations, the multivariate identity noise (with 355 components of shape and 355 
components of textures = 710 parameters) is derived from a generative model of real face 
information that is laden with explicit hypotheses (i.e. linearity and independence of identity 
from the age, sex and ethnicity factors).  Of course, both types of noise enabled the reverse 
engineering of task-relevant memory contents, at the level of individual participants and with 
greater precision and fewer parameters (and therefore trials to estimate them) with the 
multivariate identity noise.  However, a skeptic would correctly point out these more precise 
reconstructions are essentially model-bound and that we are compromising the open-
endedness of a data-driven approach with each structural hypothesis—i.e. we can only 
reconstruct the memory information in relation to the structural hypotheses explicitly 
formulated in the generative model.  This is indeed an important point that requires careful 
consideration. 
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Fig 3. Reverse engineering the contents of facial expression memory (adapted from23).  On each trial, individual 
face movements and their 7 dynamic parameters are randomly sampled to produce a 1.25s facial animation (see 
colored curves). Participants from two cultures are asked to categorize the animation by emotion (6 classic 
emotions plus “other”) and intensity (on a 5 point Likert scale from very weak to very strong). Across trials, we 
model the memory representation of each facial expression by computing the individual face movements (and their 
dynamic parameters) that are systematically associated with each emotion category response and intensity level. 
 
Facial expressions of emotion 
In this third example39, we turn to the dynamic memory information that guides the 
categorization of facial expressions of the six classic emotions (i.e. “happy,” “surprise,” “fear,” 
“anger,” “disgust,” and “sad”) in two cultures (i.e. white, and East Asian).  Here, we will again 
sample a multivariate noise to reverse engineer the contents of facial expression memory.  
However, as real-world facial expressions involve specific facial movements called Action Units 
(AUs), we incorporate AUs and their dynamic parameters as structural hypotheses of a 
generative model of random AU movements, as illustrated in Figure 3.  On each experimental 
trial, Western Caucasian (WC) and East Asian (EA) participants viewed a 1.25s facial animation 
which randomly sampled and combined a subset of multivariate AUs from a core set of 42 AUs. 
For example, in Figure 3, three AUs are selected: Outer Brow Raiser (AU2) color-coded in green, 
Lip Corner Puller (AU12) in blue, and Lips Part (AU14) in red. Each is activated with a random 
movement (see color-coded temporal activation curves for each AU; temporal parameters are 
labelled in the green curve).  
 
Participants viewed the facial animation, classified it according to one of the six emotions and 
rated its intensity on a 6-point scale (from “very weak” to “very strong”). If the facial animation 
did not correspond to any of these emotions, participants selected “other.” After many such 
trials, we reverse engineered the memorized information for each facial expression by building 
the light blue statistical relationship <AUs; Expression Category> between the dynamic AUs 
presented on each trial (the blue set of stimulus variables in the blue set) and the participant’s 
corresponding responses (e.g., ‘happy’ see Figure 3, the green set  of response variables).  The 
memory models revealed a culture-specific representation of the temporal dynamics of 
emotional intensity.  Specifically, whereas EA participants represent emotional intensity 
primarily with early movements of the eyes, WC participants represent emotional intensity 
primarily with the mouth39 (see Supplementary Video 1).  This divergence is mirrored in the 
emoticons of popular culture where “happy” is represented with “^ ^” in the EA culture and 
with “:)” in the WC culture. 
 
Applying SIR to model and understand task information processing in the brain 
So far, the examples have focused on reverse engineering task relevant information, the light-
blue, two-way interaction of the SIR framework (represented as the light blue intersection 
between the blue set of pixel samples and the green set of corresponding behavioral 
responses).  Such task-relevant features, represented as univariate features or multivariate 
shape of expressive components, are pivotal for understanding information processing in the 
brain because they represent the stimulus features that the brain must process to accomplish 
the behavioral task in question. In other words, task-relevant features are the needles of 
information that we should search for in the haystack of brain activity. To find these features, 
we now intersect the third component of SIR – in this last example, MEG signals, recorded on 
each trial in response to random stimulus samples which are behaviorally categorized.  We can 
now explore the richer three-way interactions between stimulus variation, brain measures and 
behavior (as <stimulus variation; brain; behavior>. 
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The following illustrates how this triple intersection produces the colored intersections of SIR 
that can be used to disentangle brain activity into the processing of task-relevant stimulus 
information, the processing of task-irrelevant stimulus information, and other brain processes, 
to enrich the interpretation of brain imaging data. Figure 4 illustrates the task, 40,41 where each 
participant saw an ambiguous image (‘Stimulus’) that can be perceived as being either “the 
nuns,” or “Voltaire” (squint to see the latter, see Figure 4).  In this task, the green set consists of 
the participants’ response variable across trials, which can either be “the nuns,” or “Voltaire,” or 
“don’t know.” As before, to understand the task-relevant information for each of these 
responses, we systematically and randomly sampled the image to reveal different pixels to a 
participant on each trial.  The blue set shown in Figure 4, thus includes each image pixel as a 
distinct stimulus variable (with “on” or “off” values), based on random sampling across trials.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Using SIR to study the processing of detailed information contents in the brain (adapted from 4). (A) Task-
relevant features from pixel sampling.  Random sampling of pixels across spatial frequency (SF) bands of an 
ambiguous stimulus using Bubbles42. Participants viewed the resulting sparse images (framed in blue) and were 
tasked to categorize each as “Nuns”, “Voltaire” or “don’t know”, while we recorded their brain activity (via MEG) 
and decision behavior. The pairwise relationship <Pixel; Decision> for each image pixel was computed to reveal 
task-relevant (light blue-shaded) features of each decision. (B) Brain processing of task-relevant/irrelevant features. 
Three-way relationships were also computed to reveal task-relevant feature representation (the white triple 
intersection, white framed features) and task-irrelevant feature representation (the magenta set remainder of 
magenta framed features) in brain activity. With SIR we showed where, when and how specific task-relevant 
features combine in the right Fusiform gyrus (rFG) into decision-specific representations. Pie charts standing in for 
rFG voxels indicate the representational strength (computed from the triple relationship <Pixel; MEG; Decision>) of 
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the color-coded task-relevant features framed in white in panel. To illustrate, the blue and orange features 
respectively representing the left and right nuns faces in SF1, are selectively represented in rFG voxel activity for 
“the nuns” response, whereas the green feature representing the face of Voltaire in SF3 is broadly represented 
across rFG voxel activity for “Voltaire” responses.  The color-coded plots and corresponding brains at the bottom 
indicate the strength of representation of task-relevant (left panel) and task-irrelevant (right panel) features.  Task-
irrelevant features are initially represented and then dynamically filtered out in occipital cortex ~170 ms post 
stimulus.   
  
Using the blue set of randomly sampled image pixels and the green set of corresponding 
behavioral responses, we then infer the task-relevant stimulus features for each perception, by 
computing <pixel; behavioral decision>, using (mass-bivariate) pairwise relationships. This 
computation disentangles all image pixels into those that are relevant for task behavior (i.e. for 
participants to categorize an image as being “the nuns” or “Voltaire”, as represented by the 
light-blue intersection shown in Figure 4) from those that are not (which are encompassed in 
the remainder of the blue set), just as before.  
 
To find where, when and how the brain processes these light-blue, task-relevant pixels we 
intersect the third component of SIR – MEG signals, which were recorded during the task. We 
then compute the overlapping co-representation of the stimulus features into the behavior and 
brain measures (as <pixel; MEG; decision>). The outcome of this computation identifies the light 
blue task-relevant features that the red set of MEG variables represent, as highlighted by the 
white triple intersection of the three components of SIR.  
 
Zhan et al.4 used these three SIR components to trace the dynamic flow of task-relevant 
features that were processed between 50 and 220 ms post stimulus, from their early 
representation in the visual cortex, through the ventral pathway. In the ventral pathway, they 
found that task-relevant features converge onto a few MEG voxels at the top of the right 
fusiform gyrus, ~200 ms post-stimulus, where they agglomerate into distinct representations 
that support each behavioral decision (see the color-coded “task-relevant” features in Figure 4 
and their corresponding color-coded pie-chart representations between [170 – 220ms] post-
stimulus on the rFG voxels).  Thus, using the three-way interaction between the components of 
SIR, Zhan et al. traced the dynamics of task-relevant feature processing over the first 220 ms 
post stimulus, from their early representation in visual cortex to their integration for each 
behavioral decision in the ventral pathway. 
 
What do we learn from the intersections of SIR? 
To re-cap, in the example just reviewed we have three concurrent datasets in the SIR framework 
– the blue set of stimulus information samples, the red set of brain measures, and the green set 
of behavioral responses in a task, and their four intersections (colored white, light blue, 
magenta, and yellow, as shown on Figure 1). The white triple-set intersection is transformative 
for neuroscience and neuroimaging because it disentangles the different relationships between 
stimulus, brain activity, and behavior as follows.  The white set divides each colored intersection 
into the white component and a remainder. Each of these four intersections contributes its own 
unique component of interpretation to provide a more detailed understanding of the processing 
of information contents in the brain. We review each intersection in turn.  
 
The light blue intersection 
Within a given task, the light blue remainder set isolates and represents the task-relevant 
features that the recorded brain measures do not represent. This remainder flags a de facto 
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incomplete explanation of the processing of the stimulus information that supports a particular 
behavior. This is because all task-relevant features should be represented somewhere in the 
brain to influence behavior. A complete brain measure (such as that captured by a brain-
imaging modality) should entirely absorb the light blue remainder (of task-relevant features) 
into the white set intersection (the light blue remainder is empty in the example shown in 
Figure 4, where the white framed task-relevant features are all processed for behavioral 
decision in the brain). 
 
The magenta and yellow intersections 
A magenta remainder reveals task-irrelevant stimulus features, which the brain represents but 
which do not directly influence behavior in the task. In Figure 4, the information processes 
reduce (i.e. filter out) a travelling wavefront of task-irrelevant feature representations within 
occipital cortex, around 170 ms post stimulus (compare the magenta “task-irrelevant” features 
and brain in Figure 4 to the white “task-relevant” counterparts).  Importantly, although these 
task-irrelevant features do not influence the participants’ categorization responses, they were 
amongst the features that were most strongly represented in brain activity in early visual cortex. 
However, they do not reach the fusiform gyrus in the ventral pathway, as the task-relevant 
features do.   
 
Finally, the yellow remainder isolates brain activity that relates to a behavior but not to stimulus 
variation. These brain processes likely reflect other aspects of the task, such as modulation of 
arousal, response planning, response bias, execution and so forth. 
 
General Discussion 
Here, we argued that the information contents of memory are the cornerstone of the most 
influential models of prediction, representation of categories in memory and categorical 
decision.  Although these models are all implicitly cast within an information processing 
framework, the challenge is now to precisely specify what this information is, and where, when 
and how the architecture of the brain dynamically processes it to produce behavior.  We 
reviewed SIR, a framework that can address these challenges in individual participants while 
they are actively performing an explicit task.  During such tasks, stimulus variations are applied 
on each trial to cause concurrent variations in the participant’s brain activity and behavior.    
Here, using three face tasks, we illustrated how SIR can reverse engineer, in a data-driven 
manner, the task-relevant information contents of memory by computing the two-way 
interactions between behavior and the univariate, low-structured pixel noise (in face detection), 
or the multivariate, hypothesis rich components of a generative model of face shape or 
movement (in face identity or emotion, respectively).  Note that such designs could have been 
augmented by changing the participant’s brain activity with a cue43, with direct interaction using 
repetitive TMS44–46, or other methods, thereby changing the information sampled and behavior.  
We argued that task-relevant features are the needles of information that we should search for 
in the haystack of brain activity and computed the triple interactions of SIR to do so 
(represented as the colored intersections).  With these, we showed how we can trace the 
processing of task-relevant and task irrelevant features in the brain between stimulus onset and 
behavioural decisions. 
 
Using rich stimulus variations in a task to infer information contents at recall 
Our applications of SIR identified the variety of stimulus features that can represent a visual 
category in the memory of individual participants.  We also showed how we can track neural 
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representations of these features into the variations of dynamic MEG activity (and also in other 
measures such as EEG12–15, fMRI47 and single cell recordings48). Our analyses use the important 
interactions between the bottom-up random variations of stimulus components and their top-
down usage guided by memorized knowledge.  Using these we can separate out the 
representation of task-relevant from task-irrelevant features in the brain4.  In SIR, an explicit 
generative model of the stimulus is necessary to produce the variations of stimulus features 
that can tap into multiple categorizations of the same stimulus (or category).  These 
considerations also apply to identifying the memory contents supporting different 
categorizations of a single face (e.g. identity, emotion or social trait), or different levels of 
expertise of the same object category (cf. “new Beetle” vs. “car” or “German Shepherd” vs. 
“dog” or “New York” vs. “city”).  As we will discuss, we can design hierarchical generative 
models to tap into taxonomies of categories in memory. 
 
Turning to cued recall of information contents from memory, we can use the SIR framework to 
start addressing two broad questions.  First, how can we establish what information a specific 
brain activity recorded during recall represents (whether EEG, MEG, fMRI or single unit 
recording) and how does this relate to the information represented during encoding? Second, 
what are the effects of the explicit behavioural task, both during encoding and at recall, on the 
information represented, and how do these interact? Though there is at present no 
methodology to address these questions directly, we refer the reader to Figure 4 to start 
considering how the information contents derived using the SIR framework could inform 
information rich studies of cued recall.  In Figure 4, we used a perceptual categorization task 
and computed the rich variety of stimulus features that each individual participant processed to 
enable the response “the nuns” (i.e. the fine-grained left and right nuns faces) and “Voltaire” 
(i.e. the coarser face of Voltaire and his eyes). Let’s now examine how we could use this analysis 
to inform the information contents of brain activity during recall. 
 
We could compute the explicit MEG signature of each one of the stimulus features at encoding 
(as was done in12,49).  We could then compare the neural signatures of the specific features of 
each participant with the activity elicited when the participant would recall each perception in 
the absence of an explicit stimulus, for example with a cross-decoding analysis (train classifier 
during encoding, test at recall) as has been successfully applied to fMRI50,51, EEG/MEG52–56 
measures. The balance of represented features might change between encoding and recall 
depending on the task considered in each. Such an approach could establish a similarity of brain 
activity between stimulus encoding and recall and, via the analyses of SIR, indirectly inform the 
specific features that a participant activates when recalling “the nuns” or “Voltaire.”  This 
thought experiment could generalize to studies of the information contents of other face, 
object and scene categorizations, between their encoding and recall. 
 
Stepping back from the example, we make an explicit, functional theoretical point about the 
information contents of memory:  The representation of any stimulus category should at least 
comprise the stimulus features that afforded its multiple categorizations in the history of the 
individual categorizer5,7,8 (e.g. a variety of features to categorize the relevant identities, 
expressions, ages, ethnicities and socials trait for faces, and the taxonomic categorizations of 
the objects and scenes at the required levels of expertise57).  The SIR framework provides the 
analyses tools to identify what these features of the stimulus are in memory. Consequently, 
even recalling the same scene stimulus could elicit different neural activity if we tasked the 
participant with recalling whether the cued stimulus is a city, New York, or a view of the Chrysler 
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building, because these categorizations would require different functional features, each with a 
specific neural signature. 
 
We have focussed so far on cued recall, where the framework of SIR (including rich stimulus 
variation of multiple stimulus features and explicit consideration of task) has clear applicability. 
However, this approach could also give insights into information-bearing reactivations during 
offline replay. For example, a richer design including multiple stimulus features and different 
tasks could reveal that the specific feature representations reactivated during offline replay 
differ depending on the explicit task performed during learning. Here again, the SIR perspective 
could be combined with existing cross-decoding approaches, enhancing them with the key 
features of carefully designed rich stimulus variation and explicit control of task. In the offline 
replay setting there is no explicit behavioural responses, but we might still expect to see an 
effect of the categorization task during sequence learning on the specific nature of the offline 
replay. 
 
Extension to Events, Situations and Sequences 
We now sketch how generative models could be extended to the object21 and scene 
categories22 making up events and situations.  Consider designing the generative models of two 
city scenes built around one prototype plus a specific component that identifies each scene.  At 
testing, the scene component would be randomized, and discrimination performance 
measured.  With reverse correlation, we could reverse engineer from behavior the features that 
each participant represents in memory for each scene.  We could then use the framework of SIR 
to compute the encoding models of each component and test whether we can elicit similar 
brain activations for prediction or recall, when faced with a blank screen.  A similar approach 
could be applied to the design of articulated object categories21.  However, the main drawback 
of such approaches is the large experimental time that such experiment would represent, unless 
the generative model was itself multivariate (e.g. different blocks of buildings to generate the 
two scene categories, rather than individual buildings) and we could develop encoding models 
of these multivariate components in the brain.  These expansions are part of our on-going 
research. Our methodology is also in principle extensible to studies of memory that use 
structured sequences, where the specification of a task is also important. For example, the 
sequential replay of a memorized sequence of images similar to Figure 1 might differ depending 
on whether the participant was asked to count the total number of people vs the total number 
of cars visible in the sequence.  
 
Conclusions 
Generalizing from our examples, using a range of modern imaging modalities, we can now 
measure on individual trials the brain activity of an individual participant while they are actively 
performing an explicit task. SIR takes full advantage of these richer datasets by computing the 
interactions between these three components, as <stimulus variation; brain; behavior>. These 
computations can then be used to disentangle the stimulus, brain activity and response spaces, 
including at different granularities, depending on the specific experimental design. From these, 
we make inferences about what information is being processed in the brain for a particular 
behavior, where and when, which in turn can inform computational models of behavior. SIR can 
also be applied to study any parametrizable sensory stimulus spaces (e.g. auditory24,25,58,59, as 
well as other cognitive, social and affective tasks, for reviews see23,60,60,61), and to study the 
information processing mechanisms of both brain and in silico architectures.  We propose, 
therefore, that the time is ripe to exploit the full capabilities of modern brain imaging 
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technologies and to embrace richer designs that exploit the trial-by-trial trivariate <stimulus 
information; brain; behavior>.  The analyses of such richer designs within the SIR framework can 
reveal novel interactions that further our understanding of how the brain processes information 
contents for behavior. 
 
SIR provides a number of benefits for studies of memory recall and replay.  By focusing on 
explicit tasks performed on a remembered stimulus, or stimulus category, as we have seen SIR 
can specify the information contents that must be recalled to facilitate behavior, and then guide 
the search for replay of that specific information in brain activity.  As with categorization and 
visual perception, an increased focus on explicit task control and task-relevant information 
content are critically important to understand the information contents of memory. 
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